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A MODEL OF THE ORIGINS OF
BASIC PROPERTY RIGHTS
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Abstract. This paper studies the origins of one of the most basic
of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or an orga-
nization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address the
questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge
and be made secure. I develop a model of the strategic interaction
between two players in the state-of-nature, which is an environ-
ment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions
(including property rights and the state). My analyses explores, in
particular, the roles of the players’ fighting and productive skills on
the emergence and security (or otherwise) of this property right.
“. . . there be no Propreity, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine
distinct: but only that to be every mans that he can get: and
for so long, as he can keep it.” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,
1651.
1. Introduction
Property rights are important for a variety of reasons. In the absence
of well-defined and secure property rights, mutually beneficial transac-
tions may fail to occur, and value-enhancing investments may fail to
be undertaken. If, for example, my right over the fruits of my labour
are not secure (perhaps because they are vulnerable to theft), then my
incentive to work would be adversely affected. Similarly, if the out-
put of an organization (such as a nation-state or a local community) is
not secure from pillage, then the organization’s incentives to produce
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such output in the first place would be adversely affected. Indeed, the
fundamental importance of secure property rights for the development
of the poorer parts of the world has been recently emphasized by the
World Bank in their 1997 World Development Report The State in a
Changing World.
This paper is a theoretical contribution to the study of the origins of
property rights. Specifically, I focus attention on the origins of one of
the most basic of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or
an organization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address
the questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge and
be made secure.
I develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players
in the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the
absence of any laws and institutions (including property rights and
the state). My (base) model constitutes the infinite repetition of a
two-stage game, where at the first stage each player allocates his (per-
period) time endowment between work and leisure, and then at the
second stage decides whether or not to fight in an attempt to steal the
other player’s output. My answers to the questions posed above are in
terms of the core parameters of my model, which comprise the players’
fighting skills, productive skills and discount factors.
A key aspect of my model and analyses is to entertain heterogeneity in
the players’ fighting and productive skills, the importance of which for
the emergence (or otherwise) of secure property rights is developed. For
example, I show that there exist configurations of the players’ fighting
and productive skills — such as when one player is unproductive but
strong, while the other player is productive but weak — under which
the players’ private incentives from establishing the said property rights
are in conflict. This insight challenges the not uncommon viewpoint —
see, for example, Taylor (1987) — that the Prisoners’ Dilemma game
adequately captures the (per-period) strategic interaction in the state-
of-nature; that is, the viewpoint that each and every player is strictly
better-off when secure property rights are established, a viewpoint that
my analyses shows can only be sustained when players have similar
fighting and productive skills.
This paper makes two main contributions. The first is the model
itself. In particular, as I discuss in the concluding section, my model
provides a basic framework that can be extended and/or modified to
capture various omitted features of the strategic interaction between
the two players in the state-of-nature. The second main contribution
lies in the results that I obtain, to which I now turn.
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I obtain three main sets of results. First, I derive and analyze the
set of parameter values under which the property right in question can
emerge and be made secure. This parameter set has the property that
the players’ private incentives are not in conflict. A number of insights
are obtained that inform the questions posed above. For example, it
is shown that improvements in the fighting skill of a strong player en-
hances the likelihood of the emergence of secure property rights, while
improvements in the fighting skill of a weak player enhances the like-
lihood that existing secure property fights become insecure. Second, I
derive and analyze the set of parameter values under which the prop-
erty right in question can never emerge. Third, I show that the said
property right can emerge and be made secure for a relatively wider set
of parameter values when players can resort to the mechanism of inter-
player transfers of output. For example, for some parameter values
such that the players’ private incentives are in conflict, an appropri-
ate incentive-compatible per-period transfer of output from one player
to the other would enable the property right to emerge and be made
secure; but not so in the absence of such a transfer of output.
There is a large literature that studies the role of the distribution
of property rights on economic outcomes. An early key contribution
was Coase (1960), who argued that in a “frictionless” environment, if
property rights are well-defined and secure, then economic efficiency
is typically attained. In particular, the distribution of property rights
has no affect on economic efficiency, although economic distribution
may be affected by who has what property rights. Subsequently, many
authors have explored the role of the distribution of property rights
in environments with various kinds of frictions. For example, Gross-
man and Hart (1986) argued that in an environment with incomplete
contracting, the distribution of property rights will affect economic ef-
ficiency. There is now a large literature that builds on Grossman and
Hart’s seminal contribution; a main focus of that literature is on the
issue of the optimal distribution of property rights. For a recent survey
of that literature, see Hart (1995).
Almost all of the analyses in the economics literature on the role of
property rights assumes — sometimes explicitly, but more often only
implicitly — that any specified distribution of property rights can be
almost costlessly enforced by a third party such as the courts/state.
In particular, this assumption lies at the heart of the many contribu-
tions (such as Cheung, 1963, and Demsetz, 1967) on the economics
of property rights made in the 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed, those
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contributions do not concentrate on explaining the emergence of se-
cure property rights. Instead, their focus is on explaining changes in
property rights in a society with an established government.
Although therefore mainstream economists have largely ignored the
issue of the origins of secure property rights (by taking them as exoge-
nously given), there is a large literature in political and moral philoso-
phy that is concerned with the origins of the state and conceptions of
a just society, which does indirectly (if not directly) concern the issue
of the origins of property rights. Early notable contributions to this
literature were made by Hobbes (1651), Locke (1690), Hume (1739)
and Rousseau (1762). Many key contributions were made in the twen-
tieth century by Rawls (1972), Nozick (1974), and Buchanan (1975).
The strengths of much of the more recent work lie in the formalization
of some of the ideas and arguments of the early political and moral
philosophers (see, for example, Gauthier (1986), Sugden (1986), Tay-
lor (1987), and Binmore (1994 and 1998)). Athough this literature
contains a wealth of ideas, it does not provide an analytical model of
the state-of-nature.
Buchanan (1975) presents an informal framework and analysis of the
emergence of property rights. But he does not provide an analysis of the
conditions under which property rights can be made secure — which is a
crucial issue in understanding the origins of property rights, and which
lies at the heart of my model and analyses. In the absence of any third
party in a state-of-nature with two players, property rights have to be
self-enforcing in order to be secure, which requires adopting a dynamic
perspective, and constructing a repeated interaction model of the state-
of-nature. I should emphasize that most scholars recognize that the
“enforcement” issue is of fundamental importance in understanding
the origins of institutions such as property rights. See, in particular,
North (1990), which is a classic treatise that discusses this and other
related issues. For a thought-provoking recent commentary on issues
that impinge on the study of the origins of property rights, see Basu
(2000).
I should briefly mention the literature on static models of conflict,
which, though not directly concerned with the origins of property
rights, shares some aspects with my model such as the notion that
players may resolve conflict through warfare rather than through peace-
ful negotiations. Some notable examples from this literature include
Skaperdas (1992), Grossman and Kim (1995), Hirshleifer (1995), Este-
ban and Ray (1999), and Marceau and Myers (2000).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays
down my base model and studies its unique stationary subgame per-
fect equilibrium, which I call the natural equilibrium.1 The private net
benefits to the players from establishing the property right in ques-
tion, which define their respective private incentives to do so, are de-
fined and studied in section 3. The study of the appropriate incentive-
compatibility conditions that are required to hold for the property right
to be self-enforcing (or secure) is the subject of section 4. The focus
of the analysis here is to characterize the critical values of the dis-
count factors, and then to analyze the impact on these critical values
of the players’ fighting and productive skills.2 I extend the base model
in section 5 by providing the players with the option to bargain over
inter-player transfers of output. I conclude in section 6.
2. The Framework
2.1. The Base Model. Time is divided into an infinite number of
periods, 1, 2, 3, . . . , where each period consists of T > 0 units of time.
There are two players, A and B. The decisions that each player has to
take in each period, and the structure of the interaction between them
is defined in the following two-stage game, which, for future reference,
I denote by G.
Stage 1: [How much to work?]. At the beginning of each period
the two players simultaneously choose the quantities of time that they
respectively will work. If player i (i = A,B) works for Li units of
time, where 0 ≤ Li ≤ T , then he produces fi(Li) units of output. The
production function fi satisfies the following conditions: fi(0) = 0,
f ′i(0) = +∞, f ′i > 0 and f ′′i < 0.
Stage 2: [To fight or not to fight?]. At the end of each period both
players observe the quantities of output produced by each player, and
then they simultaneously decide whether or not to fight in an attempt
to steal the other player’s output.3 If both players choose not to fight,
then player i’s levels of consumption and leisure in this period are
respectively fi(Li) and T − Li. On the other hand, if at least one
player decides to fight, then a fight takes place. There are three possible
(randomly determined) outcomes of a fight, namely:
1The “natural equilibrium” terminology, which is taken from Buchanan (1975),
aptly denotes the (equilibrium) outcome in the absence of secure property rights.
2The property right is “self-enforcing” if it is sustainable in a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the base model, which occurs if the players’ discount factors lie above
their respective critical values.
3It may be noted that my analyses and results are unaffected by the alternative
assumption that the players decide sequentially whether or not to fight.
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• With probability pi player i wins the fight and steals all of player
j’s (j 6= i) output, where pA > 0, pB > 0 and pA + pB < 1. In
this case player i’s levels of consumption and leisure in this period are
respectively fA(LA) + fB(LB) and T − Li, while player j’s levels of
consumption and leisure in this period are respectively 0 and T − Lj.4
•With probability 1−pA−pB no one wins the fight and no one steals
anything. In this case player i’s levels of consumption and leisure in
this period are respectively fi(Li) and T − Li.5
The (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility to player i in each period
is Ui(c, l), where c and l are respectively his levels of consumption and
leisure in that period. I assume that Ui takes the following (quasi-
linear) form: Ui(c, l) = c + vi(l), where vi satisfies the following con-
ditions: vi(0) = 0, v
′
i(0) = +∞, v′i > 0 and v′′i < 0.6 Each player’s
objective is to maximize the present discounted value of his expected
utility, where δi ∈ [0, 1) denotes player i’s (per-period) discount factor.
Notice, therefore, that the base model constitutes the infinite repe-
tition of the two-stage game G. It defines, in particular, the players’
basic strategic interaction in an environment — the state-of-nature —
in which neither player has property rights over the fruits of his labour
(that is, over the output that he produces by using as inputs his labour
and his productive skill). Hence, the relevance (in each period) of
stage 2 when each player entertains the possibility of stealing the other
player’s output.
A natural interpretation of the base model is implicit in its formal
description: it represents the interaction between two individuals in
the state-of-nature. The following alternative interpretation is also
applicable: the model represents the interaction in the state-of-nature
between two organizations or two groups of individuals (such as two
nation-states or two local communities or two regions within a single
nation-state). While the former interpretation is perhaps more useful
4It is implicitly being assumed that no output can be consumed until after the
outcome of a fight. This modelling assumption is a simple way to capture the role
of a fight on each player’s ex-ante incentives to work.
5It may be noted that fighting does not lead to any loss (or destruction) of output.
I adopt this assumption partly because it makes the emergence of secure property
rights that much harder. I should also emphasize that a key cost of fighting is that
it affects the players’ ex-ante incentives to work. This cost of fighting — which is
indirect but fundamental — is a key element of my model and analyses.
6I adopt this particular utility function partly to simplify the analyses (the ad-
ditive separability feature), and partly to capture the assumption that each player
has risk-neutral preferences over consumption. As is intuitive, under such an as-
sumption the emergence of secure property rights is that much harder.
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from a theoretical perspective, the latter has much relevance to the
world in which we currently live.
I use the subgame perfect equilibrium concept (SPE, for short) to
analyze the base model.7 My analysis of the base model — which
occupies the remainder of this section and sections 3 and 4 — explores,
in particular, the roles of the players’ fighting skills (as captured by
the probabilities pA and pB) and productive skills (as captured by the
production functions fA and fB) on the emergence and security (or
otherwise) of the property rights in question. In section 5 I study an
extension of the base model in which the players negotiate over inter-
player transfers of output.8
2.2. The Natural Equilibrium. I begin by characterizing the unique
stationary SPE of the base model. Since a stationary SPE of the base
model is the repeated play of a SPE of the two-stage game G, I now
derive the unique SPE of this two-stage game. The following lemma
characterizes the unique equilibrium outcome at the second stage (for
any possible actions chosen at the first stage):
Lemma 1. Consider the two-stage game G, and fix any pair (LA, LB)
chosen at stage 1. Then, at stage 2, player i’s (i = A,B) weakly
dominant action is not to fight if and only if pifj(Lj) ≤ pjfi(Li).
Proof. In the Appendix. 
The intuition for Lemma 1 follows by noting that pifj(Lj) is player
i’s expected net gain from the fight — since the fight brings in an
additional quantity of output (equal to fj(Lj)) with probability pi;
and that pjfi(Li) is his expected net loss from the fight — since in the
fight he would lose all his output with probability pj.
It follows immediately from Lemma 1 that for any pair (LA, LB)
chosen at stage 1 player i’s (equilibrium) expected payoff is Πi(Li, Lj),
7In order to somewhat simplify the analysis, but without any significant loss of
generality, I rule out SPE in which a player uses a weakly dominated strategy.
8A player’s exogenously given fighting and productive skills may be interpreted as
being determined in part from his inherent abilities and in part from (unmodelled)
costly investments undertaken at the beginning of time. I should like to note
that many of the main qualitative insights obtained in this paper are robust to an
extension of my base model in which players have the opportunity to make further
investments in such skills. Some further comments on this issue are made in the
concluding section.
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where9
Πi(Li, Lj) = (1− pj)fi(Li) + pifj(Lj) + vi(T − Li),(1)
which may be interpreted as follows. In the case of a fight, player i’s
total expected consumption is the sum of the first two terms: with
probability 1− pj he consumes all of his output, and with probability
pi he consumes all of player j’s output. In the case of no fight (when
pAfB(LB) = pBfA(LA)), he consumes all of his output and none of
player j’s output. Given (1), it is straightforward to establish the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 (The Natural Equilibrium (NE)). The base model has a
unique stationary SPE. In this natural equilibrium, player i (i = A,B)
always (in any period) sets Li = L
N
i , where L
N
i is the unique solution
to the first-order condition
(1− pj)f ′i(Li) = v′i(T − Li) (j 6= i).(2)
Player i’s equilibrium expected payoff in each period is V Ni = Πi(L
N
i , L
N
j ),
where Πi is defined above in (1).
It may be noted that the left-hand side of (2) is player i’s marginal
benefit from working, while the right-hand side is his marginal cost
from doing so. Notice that LNi does not depend on the probability
pi with which player i steals player j’s output. This is because that
probability has no affect on his marginal benefit (or marginal cost) from
working, although it will affect his NE payoff. On the other hand, LNi
is influenced by the probability pj with which player j steals player
i’s output. For example, an increase in pj — by decreasing player i’s
marginal benefit from working — decreases LNi .
10
9This is established as follows. First consider a pair (LA, LB) such that
pBfA(LA) = pAfB(LB). In that case it follows from Lemma 1 that no fight occurs,
and hence the expected payoff to player i is fi(Li) + vi(T − Li), which, however,
equals Πi(Li, Lj). Now consider a pair (LA, LB) such that pBfA(LA) 6= pAfB(LB).
In that case it follows from Lemma 1 that a fight occurs, and hence the expected
payoff to player i is (after simplifying) Πi(Li, Lj).
10For some parameter values (such as when the players are identical), no fighting
occurs in the NE. Interestingly, however, even then the equilibrium levels of work
are influenced by the players’ fighting skills. This is because even then player i’s
equilibrium marginal benefit from working is equal to the left-hand side of equation
2, since if he unilaterally deviates and chooses Li 6= LNi , then a fight occurs. The
following (Hobbesian) interpretation of this result is instructive. The absence of
property rights over one’s output means that the fear of war is not absent, notwith-
standing that in the NE no war actually takes place; it is the fear of war that
ultimately determines each player’s incentives to work.
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2.3. Comparative-Statics on Natural Equilibrium Payoffs. First,
notice that ∂V Ni /∂pj = −fi(LNi ). That is, a marginal increase in player
j’s fighting skill decreases player i’s NE payoff, and vice-versa. Now
consider the impact of a marginal change in pi on player i’s NE payoff.
I obtain that
∂V Ni
∂pi
= fj(L
N
j ) + pif
′
j(L
N
j )
∂LNj
∂pi
.(3)
A marginal change in pi has two opposing effects on player i’s NE
payoff. The first term on the right-hand side of (3), which is strictly
positive, may be called the direct effect of a marginal change in pi; it
results from the fact that a marginal increase (for example) in player i’s
fighting skill gives him (in expected terms) more of player j’s output.
On the other hand, the second term on the right-hand side of (3), which
is strictly negative, may be called the strategic effect of a marginal
change in pi; it results from the fact that a marginal increase in player
i’s fighting skill decreases player j’s incentive to work, which, in turn,
decreases the quantity of output that player i can potentially steal. I
now establish that if pi is sufficiently large, then a marginal increase in
pi decreases V
N
i ; otherwise, the opposite holds.
11
Proposition 2. If f ′′′j ≤ 0 and v′′′j ≥ 0, then there exists p∗i ∈ (0, 1)
such that
∂V Ni
∂pi
T 0 if pi S p∗i .
Proof. In the Appendix. 
In summary, if a player’s fighting skill improves, then his opponent’s
NE payoff decreases, while his own NE payoff decreases or increases
depending on whether he is strong or weak. Since a player would
have a relatively greater incentive to establish the property rights the
smaller is his NE payoff, these comparative-static results suggest that
secure property rights are most likely to emerge when both players are
sufficiently strong. However, these results also suggest that a player
would not wish to be too strong; for otherwise his opponent would
have little incentive to produce any output.
Now suppose that player i becomes more productive, which I for-
malize as follows. Player i’s new production function is f̂i, where for
any Li > 0, f̂i(Li) > fi(Li) and f̂
′
i(Li) > f
′
i(Li). Thus, not only is
11This is most transparent in the following extreme cases: if pi is close to one
then (since LNj is close to zero) the direct effect is close to zero, while if pi is close
to zero then the strategic effect is close to zero.
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his total output higher for any level of labour input, but also his mar-
ginal product is higher.12 It is straightforward to show (using (2)) that
player i would increase the amount of time spent working: that is,
L̂Ni > L
N
i . However, notice that player j would not change the amount
of time that he spends working: that is, L̂Nj = L
N
j . This is because
player i’s productive skills do not affect player j’s marginal benefit or
marginal cost from working. Of course, it does affect his NE payoff. It
is straightforward to verify that both players’ NE payoffs increase as
player i becomes more productive.
3. The Costs and Benefits of Basic Property Rights
3.1. The Property Rights Equilibrium. In order to derive a player’s
private incentive to establish the property rights in question, I compare
his NE payoff with his payoff in the property rights equilibrium (PRE,
for short), where the latter denotes the unique SPE of the base model
on the assumption that secure property rights exist; that is, on the
assumption that the players are (irrevocably) committed not to fight
at stage 2 in any period. In the unique PRE, player i chooses to work
for LFi units of time, where L
F
i is the unique solution to the first-order
condition
f ′i(Li) = v
′
i(T − Li).(4)
In the PRE player i’s payoff in each period is V Fi = fi(L
F
i )+vi(T−LFi ).
It is straightforward to show that LNi < L
F
i (i = A,B). This “under-
investment” result may be interpreted as arising from a “hold-up” prob-
lem: in the absence of secure property rights, player i does not receive
the full marginal return from his work, and hence, he does not work at
his first-best level. Indeed, this interpretation is instructive as it draws
attention to the close connection between insecure property rights and
hold-up problems. An important reason, for example, for relatively
little productive investment in the poorer parts of the world is that the
absence of secure property rights leads to hold-up problems, which, in
turn, adversely affect ex-ante incentives to make such investments.
3.2. Private Incentives. Define ∆i ≡ V Fi − V Ni . If ∆A ≥ 0 and
∆B ≥ 0, then there is no cost from establishing the property rights,
only benefits. However, if for some i and j (i 6= j) ∆i > 0 and ∆j < 0,
then there is a cost and a benefit from establishing these rights; the
cost is to player j and the benefit to player i. It should be noted that
both ∆A and ∆B cannot be negative, since ∆A +∆B > 0.
12An example is when fi(Li) = λiLi and f̂i(Li) = λ̂iLi, where λ̂i > λi > 0.
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A key insight obtained below is that the set of parameter values such
that ∆i < 0 (for some i) is non-empty. This insight challenges the not
uncommon viewpoint that the Prisoners’ Dilemma game adequately
captures the (per-period) strategic interaction in the state-of-nature;
that is, the viewpoint that each and every player is strictly better-
off when secure property rights are established. My insight is most
transparent when one player is strong but unproductive, while the other
player is weak but productive. In such a case the strong player would
loose out when the property rights are established (since he would
then not be able to steal any output from the other, more productive
player).13 It may thus be noted that an important advantage of my
model of the state-of-nature over the Prisoners’ Dilemma game based
model is that it allows one to study the implications of heterogeneity in
the players’ fighting and productive skills on the emergence or otherwise
of secure property rights.
It is straightforward to show that
∆i T 0⇐⇒
[
V Fi −
[
fi(L
N
i ) + vi(T − LNi )
]]
T
[
pifj(L
N
j )− pjfi(LNi )
]
.
(5)
If the players are identical — that is, they have identical preferences
(vA(l) = vB(l) for all l ∈ [0, T ]), identical productive skills (fA(L) =
fB(L) for all L ∈ [0, T ]) and identical fighting skills (pA = pB) — then
it follows from Lemma 1 that no fighting occurs in the NE. That is,
the right-hand side of the second inequality in (5) is zero. Since, by
definition, the left-hand side of the second inequality in (5) is strictly
greater than zero, it thus follows that if the players are identical then
∆A > 0 and ∆B > 0. This result implies that in order for there to
exist conflict in the players’ private incentives to establish the basic
property rights, the players have to be different in some respects (such
as in their productive and/or fighting skills). That is, heterogeneity in
the players’ fighting skills and/or productive skills is necessary for it
to be the case that ∆i < 0 for some i. It is trivial to show that the set
of parameter values under which conflicting private incentives exist is
non-empty.14
13As I discuss in section 5, since the sum of the payoffs in the PRE exceeds the
sum of the payoffs in the NE (i.e., since ∆A + ∆B > 0), secure property rights
might be established in this case if, for example, the productive but weak player
transfers some output (in each period) to the strong but unproductive player.
14For example, if pj is arbitrarily close to zero and pi > 0 but bounded away
from one, then ∆i < 0. This is because if pj is arbitrarily close to zero, then the
difference LFi − LNi is arbitrarily close to zero, which, in turn, implies that the
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3.3. Comparative-Statics on Incentives. Since fighting skills have
no effect on each player’s PRE payoff, it follows immediately from
Proposition 2 that an improvement in player i’s fighting skill enhances
both players’ private incentives to establish the property rights in ques-
tion provided that player i is sufficiently strong. Now suppose that both
players’ fighting skills improve. In that case the total change in player
i’s private incentives is captured by the sum of the partial derivative
of ∆i w.r.t. pi and the partial derivative of ∆i w.r.t. pj. I obtain that
∂∆i
∂pi
+
∂∆i
∂pj
= fi(L
N
i )− fj(LNj )− pif ′j(LNj )
∂LNj
∂pi
.
In general, this expression can be positive or negative. However, if
the players are identical, then this expression is strictly positive. This
means that if the players are identical, then improvements in both play-
ers’ fighting skills enhances their respective private incentives to estab-
lish the property rights.
The collective incentive, which is captured by the sum ∆A + ∆B,
defines the surplus from establishing the property rights. I obtain that
∂(∆A +∆B)
∂pi
= −pif ′j(LNj )
∂LNj
∂pi
,
which is strictly positive. Thus, the collective incentive to establish
the property rights is increasing in each player’s fighting skill. This
result makes intuitive sense, since the net effect of a marginal increase
in pi is that in the NE, player j produces less output (the strategic
effect), which decreases both players’ NE payoffs, and hence, enhances
the collective incentive.
Now suppose that player i’s productive skill improves (in the manner
formalized above, at the end of section 2.3). It is straightforward to
show that the increase in his PRE payoff is larger than the increase in
his NE payoff. As such, as he becomes more productive, his private
incentive to establish the property rights enhances. However, since
player i’s productive skills have no effect on player j’s PRE payoff,
player j’s private incentive to establish the property rights diminishes.
It is straightforward to show that the collective incentive to establish
the property rights is diminished as one (or both) players become more
productive.
The comparative-static results obtained above indicate that improve-
ments in productive skills adversely affect incentives to establish prop-
erty rights, while improvements in fighting skills affects them positively.
left-hand side of (5) is arbitrarily close to zero. Hence ∆i < 0 provided that pi > 0
but bounded away from one — where the latter condition ensures that LNj > 0.
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This insight suggests that in order to promote and maintain such in-
centives, investments in productive skills should go hand-in-hand with
investments in fighting skills.
4. On the Emergence of Secure Property Rights
I now derive and analyze the incentive-compatibility conditions that
are required to hold in order for there to exist a (necessarily, non-
stationary) SPE whose equilibrium path is identical to the PRE path
(in which, in each period, LA = L
F
A, LB = L
F
B and no fight occurs).
Since the PRE is not an SPE of the base model, the PRE path can
potentially be sustained as a SPE path only by the threat of appropriate
(and credible) punishment should any player unilaterally deviate from
the PRE path. It is worth emphasizing therefore that the property
rights in question are made secure (when they can be) in a self-enforcing
manner, without any third-party enforcement.15
Straightforward application of appropriate Folk Theorems from the
Theory of Repeated Games would allow us to dispense with this issue
without too much fuss. This is because such results can be applied
to show that the PRE path is sustainable as a SPE path of the base
model. But, these results apply if and only if players are sufficiently
patient. In particular, if and only if players are infinitely patient (i.e.,
in the limit as both δA and δB tend to one) is it possible to show
that for any configuration of the players’ fighting and productive skills,
the PRE path is sustainable as a SPE path. Although this (limiting)
result provides a benchmark result, it is not particularly useful, since
the assumption of negligible discounting is not particularly plausible.
As such it is important to conduct an analyses when players are not
sufficiently patient. The focus of my analyses below is to characterize
and analyze the critical values of the discount factors (which have the
property that the PRE path is sustainable as a SPE path if the players’
discount factors lie above their respective critical values).
I adopt the well-known “trigger-strategy” approach, in which the
PRE path is sustained as a SPE path by moving play to the NE if
any player ever (unilaterally) deviates from the PRE path. Since this
punishment path is a SPE path, it is relatively easy to derive the ap-
propriate incentive-compatibility conditions under which these trigger
strategies constitute an SPE, and thus establish:
15Indeed, since there are no third parties in the environment under consideration,
any enforcement mechanism can only involve the two players.
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Theorem 1 (Trigger-Strategy Equilibrium (TSE)). The PRE path can
be sustained as a SPE path (using the trigger strategies) if and only if
for each i = A,B, δi ≥ δi, where
δi = 1−
∆i
pi[fj(LFj )− fj(LNj )]
(j 6= i).(6)
Proof. In the Appendix.16 
As would be expected, the critical values of the discount factors δA
and δB depend, in particular, on the players’ fighting and productive
skills. Notice that if the players’ private incentives to establish the
property rights are in conflict — that is, ∆i < 0 for some i — then
δi > 1 and hence, it follows from Theorem 1 that the PRE path cannot
be sustained as a SPE (using the trigger strategies). Indeed, the TSE
exists only if the parameters are such that both players strictly prefer
the PRE over the NE — that is, ∆A > 0 and ∆B > 0.
17
It is straightforward to verify that δi is decreasing in pj. Thus, a
marginal increase (for example) in player j’s fighting skill makes player
i more likely to “cooperate” (in the sense of respecting the property
rights); this is because a marginal increase in pj reduces V
N
i , which,
in turn, makes deviation from the PRE path less attractive to player
i. As I now show, a marginal change in pi, on the other hand, affects
player i’s willingness to cooperate in a not-so-simple manner. In the
Appendix, I establish that for each i = A,B,
∂δi
∂pi
T 0 ⇐⇒ (1− δi)fj(LFj ) + δi
∂V Ni
∂pi
T 0 (j 6= i).(7)
Proposition 2 above states that player i’s NE payoff V Ni is not mono-
tonic in pi, and hence, it immediately follows (from (7)) that δi is not
monotonic in pi either. However, using Proposition 2, it is straight-
forward to establish that if f ′′′i ≤ 0 and v′′′i ≥ 0, then there exists
16Player i’s incentive constraint δi ≥ δi is equivalent to δi∆i ≥ (1 −
δi)[Πi(LNi , L
F
j ) − V Fi ], which is interpreted as follows. The left-hand side of this
inequality is his (long-run) average cost by deviating from the PRE path; this is
because from next period onwards, his per-period loss is V Fi − V Ni (≡ ∆i). The
right-hand side is his (short-run) average benefit from the (optimal) deviation; this
is because his (one-period) gain from this deviation is Πi(LNi , L
F
j )− V Fi .
17Perhaps not surprisingly, the incentive-compatibility conditions which ensure
that the property rights are self-enforcing are much more severe than the conditions
which ensure that the players do have private incentives to establish such property
rights.
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Figure 1. An illustration of the effect of a small increase
in pi on the existence of the TSE.
p̂i ∈ (0, 1) such that
∂δi
∂pi
T 0 if pi S p̂i.
In summary, as player i’s fighting skill increases, his opponent becomes
more likely to cooperate, while he himself becomes less or more likely to
cooperate depending on whether or not he is sufficiently weak. These
comparative-static results have a number of implications, which, in
general terms, may be put as follows:
• If player i is sufficiently strong and secure property rights do not
exist, then a marginal increase in player i’s strength may create the
conditions for the emergence of secure property rights. But, if player i is
sufficiently strong and secure property rights do exist, then a marginal
decrease in player i’s strength may create conditions for the property
rights to be no longer secure.
• If player i is sufficiently weak, then, whether or not secure property
rights exist, a marginal change in player i’s strength may create the
conditions for the non-existence of secure property rights.
Figure 1 illustrates, in more specific terms, the effect of a small
increase in pi on the emergence of secure property rights. The initial
critical discount factors are δi and δj, while the critical discount factors
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after a small increase in pi are δ̂j for player j, δ̂
s
i for player i if he is
strong and δ̂
w
i if he is weak.
18 I now provide some interpretation of the
various regions in Figure 1.
In regions 1–6 the parameters are such that both initially and after a
small increase in pi, at least one of the player’s critical discount factor
lies above his discount factor. Thus, at least one of the player’s discount
factor is so small that a small increase in pi has no effect on the issue of
the existence of the TSE; secure property rights do not exist initially,
and do not exist after a small increase in pi.
In regions 7–9 the parameters are such that initially δi and/or δj are
too small (lie below their respective initial critical discount factors),
and the TSE does not exist. However, after a small increase in pi,
player j is willing to cooperate, and player i is willing to cooperate if
and only if he is strong. An important insight provided by this result
may be put as follows. An improvement in the fighting skill of a strong
player (such as the USA) can improve the likelihood of the emergence
of secure property rights.
In region 10 secure property rights do exist initially, and remain in
place after a small increase in pi if and only if player i is strong. An
important insight provided by this result may be put as follows. An
improvement in the fighting skill of a weak player may increase the
likelihood that existing secure property rights become insecure.
In region 11 the TSE does not exist initially, but does after a small
increase in pi (by essentially making player j willing to cooperate).
Finally, in region 12 the parameters are such that the players’ discount
rates are so high that they always lie above the relevant critical discount
factors.
Now consider an improvement in a player’s productive skills (as for-
malized above, at the end of section 2.3). Since an improvement in
player i’s productive skill enhances his private incentives (i.e., increases
∆i), it immediately follows from (6) that δi decreases following an im-
provement in player i’s productive skill. Thus, the more productive a
player, the more willing is he to cooperate (and respect the property
rights). What about his opponent? As player i’s productive skills im-
prove, it has been shown that ∆j decreases. Furthermore, it is easy
to verify that the difference between player i’s output levels in the
PRE and NE is higher the more productive he is. It then immediately
18He is strong if the initial pi < p̂i, and weak if pi > p̂i, where p̂i is defined
above.
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follows that δj increases following an improvement in player i’s pro-
ductive skill. Thus, the more productive a player, the less willing is his
opponent to cooperate.
Since, in fact, the base model has a multiplicity of SPE, one cannot
rule out the possibility that the PRE path is sustainable for a relatively
wider set of parameter values by some SPE other than the TSE. How-
ever, rather than pursue that issue here, I now conclude this section
by characterizing a set of parameter values under which there does not
exist an SPE that sustains the PRE path; that is, for such parameter
values secure property rights can never emerge.19
Theorem 2 (Non-Emergence of Secure Property Rights). If the pa-
rameters are such that either δA < δ
∗
A or δB < δ
∗
B, then there does
not exist an SPE of the base model in which the equilibrium path is the
PRE path, where
δ∗i = 1−
[
∆i + pifj(L
N
j )
pifj(LFj )
]
(j 6= i).(8)
Proof. In the Appendix. 
It may be noted that, not surprisingly, for any parameter values,
0 < δ∗i < 1 and δ
∗
i < δi, where δi is defined in Theorem 1. Using (3)
and Proposition 2, it can be shown that there exists p′i such that
∂δ∗i
∂pi
T 0 if pi S p′i, and
∂δ∗j
∂pi
S 0 if pi S p′i.
Thus, a marginal change in player i’s fighting skill has, in general, an
ambiguous effect on the range of discount factors under which secure
property rights can never emerge. For example, if player i is weak (i.e.,
pi is small), then a marginal increase in his fighting skill increases δ
∗
i but
decreases δ∗j . However, unambiguous results can be obtained in some
special cases. Consider, for example, the case in which the players’
discount factors are identical (i.e., δA = δB = δ), and, in which their
fighting and productive skills are such that δ∗A > δ
∗
B. It follows from
Theorem 2 that in this case, secure property rights can never emerge
if the players’ common discount factor δ < δ∗A. Hence, it follows from
the above comparative-static results that an improvement in player
A’s fighting skill increases the likelihood that secure property rights
19In the next section I return to the issue of whether or not the PRE path can
be sustained for a relatively wider set of parameter values than for which the TSE
exists, but by allowing for inter-player transfers of output.
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can never emerge if player A is weak; while the opposite is the case if
player A is strong. This insight reinforces the following key message
of this paper: an improvement in the fighting skill of a weak player is
inimical to the emergence of secure property rights, while the opposite
is the case with an improvement in the fighting skill of a strong player.
5. The Role of Inter-Player Transfers of Output
It has been shown in the previous section that there exists a range
of parameter values under which the PRE path cannot be sustained in
any SPE of the base model. In particular, this is the case when the
players’ private incentives to establish the property rights are in conflict
and they are not sufficiently patient. Does this mean that under such
conditions the players are doomed to live in the state-of-nature with-
out secure property rights? Or, perhaps more optimistically, does this
mean that they will resort to some mechanism which (in this two-player
environment) might enable the emergence of secure property rights? In
this section I explore the potential role of one such mechanism, namely,
inter-player transfers of output.
More precisely, I now extend the base model by allowing the players
the option to negotiate over whether or not to establish the property
rights under consideration. The key aspect of such negotiations is that
a player can offer the other player (or, as the case may be, to de-
mand from him) some output in return for agreeing to establish these
property rights. Of course, since negotiated agreements are not au-
tomatically enforceable, each player will have the option to (ex-post)
renege on his part of the agreement, whether or not the other player
does so. This means that only those agreements which satisfy certain
incentive-compatibility conditions are relevant to the negotiations. A
main objective of the analysis to follow is to explore the extent to which
such inter-player transfers of output enhance the range of parameter
values under which secure property rights can emerge.
5.1. An Extended Base Model with Bargaining. There are sev-
eral alternative, plausible manners in which the opportunity to negoti-
ate can be interlaced within the structure of the base model. As such
there are several alternative, plausible extensions of the base model in
which the mechanism of inter-player transfers of output exists. It turns
out, however, that (because of the underlying stationary structure of
the environment) the main analyses of all such extended models are
identical. I now turn to a description of one such extended model. A
key characteristic of this extension of the base model is that the players
can negotiate only once, namely, at the beginning of time.
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Before the beginning of period 1, the players meet to discuss whether
or not to establish the property rights under consideration, and, whether
or not one of the players should give some of his per-period output to
the other player. Let the game form that formally encapsulates this
bargaining process be denoted by φ, which has two types of outcomes:
(i) the players reach an agreement t ∈ <, with the interpretation that
in each period, player A gives t units of output to player B and both
players will not fight,20 and (ii) the players fail to reach an agreement.
If no agreement is struck, then play proceeds according to the base
model. However, if an agreement is struck, then (since it is not auto-
matically enforceable) play proceeds according to an extended version
of the base model in which at the end of each period, before stage 2
takes place, the player who has to make the payment decides whether
or not to do so. Thus, notice that in each period, each player can
choose whether or not to renege on his part of the agreement.21
I assume that if the players fail to reach an agreement in φ, then
play (in the base model) proceeds according to the NE. The motiva-
tion for this assumption is that if they do not agree to establish the
property rights when they are in face-to-face communication, then it
is unlikely that secure property rights will emerge implicitly via some
non-stationary SPE of the base model. Hence, if the players do not
reach an agreement in φ, then player i’s payoff in each period is V Ni .
5.2. Existence of Bargaining Equilibrium with Agreement. An
agreement in φ, which is characterized by a real number t, is self-
enforcing if in the extended base game that ensues there is a SPE
whose equilibrium path is the following extended PRE path: in each
period, player i (i = A,B) sets Li = L
F
i , the agreed transfer t is
implemented and no fight takes place. I assume that if any player
20Notice that t can be positive or negative. A negative t means that it is player
B who will give −t units of output to player A.
21There are several assumptions implicitly built into the above described ex-
tension of the base model. First, if the players fail to reach an agreement at the
beginning of time, then they cannot attempt to do so in any later period. Sec-
ond, an agreement struck at the beginning of time cannot be renegotiated at any
later date. Third, an agreed transfer of output is constant across all periods. It
is straightforward to consider various alternative, plausible extensions of the base
model in which one or more of such assumptions is relaxed. For example, one could
consider an extended model in which the players negotiate at the beginning of each
period over whether or not to establish the property rights (with some transfer of
output) for just that period. As I mentioned above, because of the stationary struc-
ture that underlies the environment, it turns out that the main analyses of such
alternative, plausible extended models are identical to the analysis of the extended
model described above in which the players negotiate only at the beginning of time.
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unilaterally deviates from this extended PRE path (i.e., violates the
agreement), then immediately play proceeds according to the NE.22
Through a straightforward extension of the arguments used in the proof
of Theorem 1, I obtain that an agreement to establish the property
rights with player A giving t ∈ < units of output to player B in each
period is incentive-compatible (or self-enforcing) if the following two
inequalities hold:23
t ≤ ∆A − pA(1− δA)[fB(LFB)− fB(LNB )](9)
t ≥ pB(1− δB)[fA(LFA)− fA(LNA )]−∆B.(10)
Since it is straightforward to verify that an agreement t is incentive-
compatible only if it is feasible in the sense that fA(L
F
A) ≥ t ≥ −fB(LFB),
and Pareto-dominates disagreement in the sense that V FA −t > V NA and
V FB + t > V
N
B , it follows that if there exists an incentive-compatible
agreement, then agreement to establish secure property rights is struck.24
It thus follows immediately that:
Theorem 3 (Existence of a Bargaining Equilibrium with Agreement).
In the extended base model with bargaining, the players strike an agree-
ment to establish the property rights in question with some inter-player
transfer of output t∗ if and only if the parameters are such that
∆A +∆B ≥ pA(1− δA)[fB(LFB)− fB(LNB )] + pB(1− δB)[fA(LFA)− fA(LNA )].
(11)
Since the right-hand side of (11) is strictly positive, this means that
in order for agreement to be struck, the surplus (or collective incentive),
which is the left-hand side of (11), must be sufficiently large; it is not
enough that there just exists some surplus, i.e., ∆A+∆B > 0 — which,
22A player could deviate at any one of the three stages within each period: either
at stage 1 by choosing Li 6= LFi , or, if this is relevant to him, after stage 1 but before
stage 2 by not transfering the agreed output t to the other player (I call this stage,
stage 1.5), or, at stage 2 by choosing to fight.
23These two inequalities are respectively player A’s and player B’s incentive
constraints. For example, the first of these inequalities is player A’s incentive
constraint, which can rewritten as δA(∆A− t) ≥ (1− δA)[ΠA(LNA , LFB)− (V FA − t)],
which is interpreted as follows. The left-hand side of this inequality is his (long-run)
average cost by deviating from the extended PRE path; this is because from next
period onwards, his per-period loss is (V FA − t) − V NA (≡ ∆A − t). The right-hand
side is his (short-run) average benefit from the (optimal) deviation; this is because
his (one-period) gain from this deviation is ΠA(LNA , L
F
B)− (V FA − t).
24This is based on the (plausible) assumption that the equilibrium outcome in
φ is Pareto-efficient.
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recall, holds for any parameter values.25 Not surprisingly, (11) holds in
the limit as both δA and δB tend to one, but not when δA = δB = 0. The
key issue, however, is whether or not it holds for a relatively wider range
of parameter values than for which the TSE exists. It is straightforward
to show that there exists parameter values under which the TSE does
not exist, but the bargaining equilibrium with agreement does exist.26
This is the case, for example, for some parameter values such that ∆i <
0 for some i. Hence, when the players’ private incentives to establish
the property rights are in conflict (such as when one player is strong
but unproductive, while the other player is weak but productive), inter-
player transfers of output can be a mechanism through which secure
property rights get established.
Stated more generally, Theorem 3 implies that the mechanism of
inter-player transfers of output does allow for the emergence of secure
property rights in circumstances in which they would not otherwise
emerge. The intuition for this conclusion follows by noting that when
the players negotiate over whether or not to establish secure property
rights with an appropriate, per-period transfer of some output between
them, their respective private incentives are no longer relevant to the
issue of the emergence of secure property rights; it is their collective
incentive that takes on centre stage. More precisely, since their collec-
tive incentive (namely, ∆A+∆B) is the sum of their respective private
incentives, the players’ private incentives do continue matter, but only
to the extent that they determine the collective incentive. For exam-
ple, conflicting private incentives no longer pose the kind of threat (to
the emergence of secure property rights) that they did in the analysis
of section 4, since what matters to the analysis in this section is the
collective incentive.
5.3. Nash Bargains: Characterization of the Agreement. The
insights derived above are based on teasing out the implications of the
requirement that negotiated agreements must be incentive-compatible,
and, on the plausible assumption that the outcome in φ is Pareto-
efficient. Theorem 3 states the condition on the parameters under
which the bargaining equilibrium with agreement exists. But it is silent
on the characteristics of the equilibrium negotiated transfer. This is not
surprising since that depends on the details of the bargaining process φ.
I now assume that the bargaining process is such that the equilibrium
25As would be expected, the requirement that an agreement be incentive-
compatible is somewhat constraining.
26It is of course trivial to verify that if a TSE exists then the bargaining equilib-
rium with agreement also exists.
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negotiated transfer t∗ can be characterized by the Nash bargaining
solution (NBS, for short) with the disagreement point (V NA , V
N
B ).
27
Ignoring for a moment that the equilibrium negotiated transfer must
be incentive-compatible (i.e., t∗ must satisfy (9) and (10)), the NBS is
in general captured by the Split-the-Difference rule, whose application
here implies that player i (i = A,B) receives a utility payoff ui that
equals his disgreement payoff V Ni plus one-half of the surplus ∆A+∆B.
Letting t̂ denote the associated transfer, this means that
uA ≡ V FA −t̂ = V NA +
∆A +∆B
2
and uB ≡ V FB +t̂ = V NB +
∆A +∆B
2
.
This, in turn, implies that
t̂ =
∆A −∆B
2
.
It follows immediately from the definition of the NBS that the equilib-
rium negotiated transfer t∗ = t̂ provided that t̂ is incentive-compatible,
which (after substituting for t̂ in (9) and (10), and simplifying) means
that t∗ = t̂ if the parameters are such that
∆A +∆B > 2max{ξA, ξB},
where ξi = pi(1 − δi)[fj(LFj ) − fj(LNj )]. Thus, when the surplus is
sufficiently large, then the NBS implies that the equilibrium negotiated
transfer is made by the player whose private incentive (or net benefit)
from establishing the property rights in question is relatively higher.
The exact level of the transfer depends on the amount by which his net
benefit exceeds that of the other player.
Now suppose that t̂ is not incentive-compatible. This can happen
because this level of transfer is either too high or too low, in the follow
senses. It is too high (which, more precisely, means it fails to satisfy
player A’s incentive constraint (9)) in the sense that agreement to it
would give player A a utility level that lies below what he can obtain
from reneging on this agreement. Symmetrically, it is too low (which,
more precisely, means it fails to satisfy player B’s incentive constraint
(10)) in the sense that agreement to it would give player B a utility level
that lies below what he can get by reneging on this agreement. In these
cases, the NBS is a corner solution. In the former case, t∗ = ∆A − ξA,
which is the equilibrium agreed transfer when the parameters are such
that ξA+ ξB < ∆A+∆B < 2ξA; while in the latter case, t
∗ = ξB −∆B,
which is the equilibrium agreed transfer when the parameters are such
that ξA + ξB < ∆A +∆B < 2ξB.
27As is well-known — see, for example, Muthoo (1999) — this may be justified
by assuming that φ is the Rubinsteinian, alternating-offers bargaining process.
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6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
A main contribution of this paper is my model of the state-of-nature.
It captures the essential, basic elements of the strategic interaction
between two players in the state-of-nature. Although, as I shall discuss
below, the model contains several restrictive assumptions, an important
aspect of my model is that it provides a basic framework that can be
extended and/or modified to capture various omitted features of the
strategic interaction between the two players in the state-of-nature.
The second main contribution lies in the results I have obtained.
Some of the most fundamental insights provided by these results are
as follows:
• Heterogeneity in the players’ fighting and productive skills plays a
crucial role in determining their incentives to establish secure property
rights. In particular, there exist configurations of the players’ fighting
and productive skills — such as when one player is strong but unpro-
ductive, while the other player is weak but productive — under which
the players’ private incentives are in conflict.
• In order to promote and maintain incentives, improvements in the
players’ productive skills (or economic prosperity) should go hand-in-
hand with improvements in their fighting skills (or military technolo-
gies).
• If the players’ fighting and productive skills are such that their
private incentives to establish the property rights are in conflict, then
in order for secure property rights to emerge, it is necessary that the
players negotiate over whether or not to establish the property rights
with an appropriate, per-period transfer of output between them. That
is, in such circumstances, resorting to the mechanism of inter-player
transfers of output may be required for the property rights to emerge
and be made secure.
•When the players’ private incentives are not in conflict, then secure
property rights might emerge without the mechanism of inter-player
transfers of output. The likelihood of this happening is higher the
more concerned are the players for their future payoffs, or the greater
are their fighting skills, or the lower are their productive skills.
• Improvements in the fighting skill of a strong player (such as
the USA) enhances the likelihood of the emergence of secure prop-
erty rights. On the other hand, improvements in the fighting skill of a
weak player enhances the likelihood that existing secure property rights
become insecure.
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• Establishing secure property rights is “costly”, in the sense that
costly but unproductive investments in fighting skills are required for
their emergence and security.
I now turn to a discussion of the main limitations of my model as
a model of the state-of-nature with two players.28 First, a simplifying
but somewhat restrictive assumption that underlies my model is that
the players cannot make any (further) investments in their fighting
and productive skills. Although many of my main qualitative insights
would be robust to allowing for such investments, it would be useful
to formally address this issue partly because new insights may be ob-
tained. One potential way of extending the base model to allow for
such investments is as follows. At the beginning of each period, before
stage 1, each player has the option to spend some time to improve his
fighting skill and/or his productive skill. By incorporating the possi-
bility of such costly investments, the equilibrium growth rates of the
players’ fighting and productive skills can be determined, which, in
turn, will affect the dynamics of the likelihood of the emergence of
secure property rights.
Second, it is important to relax the implicit assumption that a player
cannot steal the other player’s endowments (of productive and military
technologies, and/or of time); in my model a player can only steal
the other player’s final output. This, of course, raises some important
issues. For example, stealing all of a player’s endowments is like making
that player one’s slave — which is, however, not the case if one only
steals that player’s technologies. The issues of how a player might then
make use of the stolen endowments, and, of how he would keep them
over time — in the face of the other player’s incentive to fight back —
need to be addressed. A key question is whether or not there can exist
configurations of the players’ fighting and productive skills such that
in equilibrium one player enslaves the other, and, maintains the slave’s
incentives not to break free by some appropriate, minimal lump-sum
transfer of output.
Third, it would be interesting to explore the implications of relaxing
some of the informational assumptions. For example, I have assumed
28I should like to note that addressing some of these limitations — by extend-
ing and/or modifying my model — should not necessarily require any conceptual
innovations (although the analyses of some of these extensions may be technically
demanding). In contrast, when extending my model to an environment with three
(or more) players, new conceptual issues will necessarily arise such as the issue of
who forms a coalition with whom. In Muthoo (2002), I construct and study a model
of the state-of-nature with three players that is based upon the model studied in
the current paper.
A MODEL OF THE ORIGINS OF BASIC PROPERTY RIGHTS 25
that a player’s output is observable by the other player. It would be
interesting to explore the implications of an extension of my model in
which a player receives an imperfect signal of his opponent’s output
level. A focal question is whether or not such imperfect observabil-
ity, which seems like a reasonable assumption, adversely affects the
likelihood of the emergence of secure property rights.
Fourth, there is no room for specialization and trade in my model.
It would be interesting and useful to extend my model by having, for
example, two consumption goods. In such an environment, secure prop-
erty rights might have a relatively better chance of emerging when each
player specializes in the production of one good, and, then obtains the
other good through trade with his opponent.
There are, of course, several other potentially fruitful extensions of
my model; extensions, like those discussed above, which would enhance
our understanding of the topic under consideration.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the two-stage game G, and fix an
arbitrary pair (LA, LB) chosen at stage 1. If the players end up in a fight
at stage 2, then player i’s expected payoff is
Efi = piUi(ĉ, li) + pjUi(0, li) + (1− pi − pj)Ui(ci, li),
where j 6= i, ĉ = fA(LA) + fB(LB), ci = fi(Li) and li = T − Li. Letting
Enfi denote player i’s payoff if the players do not end up in a fight, where
Enfi = Ui(ci, li), it follows (after substituting for the assumed quasi-linear
form of player i’s utility function) that
Efi T E
nf
i ⇐⇒ pifj(Lj) T pjfi(Li).
Without loss of generality, but in order to simplify the analysis, I assume
that when indifferent between having a fight and not having a fight, each
player prefers the latter. It thus follows that at stage 2 each player has
a weakly dominant action: if Efi ≤ Enfi then player i’s weakly dominant
action is not to fight, while if Efi > E
nf
i then player i’s weakly dominant
action is to fight.
Proof of Proposition 2. It follows from (2) that
∂LNj
∂pi
=
f ′j(L
N
j )
Υ
, where Υ = (1− pi)f ′′j (LNj ) + v′′j (T − LNj ).
Hence, after substituting for the derivative of LNj with respect to pi, and
then simplifying, (3) becomes:
∂V Ni
∂pi
= fj(LNj ) +
pi[f ′j(L
N
j )]
2
Υ
.
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Notice that29
lim
pi→0
∂V Ni
∂pi
= fj(LFj ) and lim
pi→1
∂V Ni
∂pi
= −∞.
Furthemore, notice that the derivative of V Ni with respect to pi is continuous
in pi, and that it is independent of pj . Now, it is straightforward to verify
that
∂2V Ni
∂p2i
< 0 provided that
∂Υ
∂pi
≥ 0.
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 2 the derivative of Υ with respect to pi
is positive. Hence, the second derivative of V Ni with respect to pi is strictly
negative. The desired conclusion follows immediately from the above results
concerning the nature of the derivative of V Ni with respect to pi.
Proof of Theorem 1. The following argument establishes the
incentive-compatible condition under which player i cannot benefit from a
(one-shot, unilateral) deviation from the PRE path. Fix an arbitrary period
n (where n = 1, 2, . . . ), and suppose that up until the end of period n − 1
neither of the two players deviated from the PRE path. Player i considers
(at stage 1 of this period) the net benefit from a (one-shot, unilateral) de-
viation in which he chooses Lni 6= LFi (and conforms to the trigger strategy
thereafter). His payoff from not conducting such a deviation (and thus con-
forming to the trigger strategy) is, of course, V Fi /(1−δi). On the other hand,
his payoff from the (one-shot) deviation of setting Lni = Li, where Li 6= LFi ,
equals Πi(Li, LFj ) + δiV
N
i /(1− δi). Since the maximum value of this payoff
(across all possible values of Li 6= LFi ) equals Πi(LNi , LFj ) + δiV Ni /(1 − δi),
it follows that player i cannot benefit from a (one-shot) deviation to any
Lni 6= LFi if and only if
δi∆i ≥ (1− δi)[Πi(LNi , LFj )− V Fi ].(A.1)
Now suppose that player i conforms at stage 1 of period n (by setting Lni =
LFi ), but considers whether or not to conduct a (one-shot) deviation at
stage 2. It is trivial to verify that he will conform to his trigger strategy
(and not fight) if and only if δi∆i ≥ (1 − δi)[Πi(LFi , LFj ) − V Fi ]. Since
Πi(LNi , L
F
j ) > Πi(L
F
i , L
F
j ), it follows that this inequality is implied by (A.1).
Finally, note that since Πi(LNi , L
F
j ) = V
N
i + pi[fj(L
F
j )− fj(LNj )], inequality
A.1 becomes (after substituting for Πi(LNi , L
F
j ), using this expression, and
then simplifying) ∆i ≥ pi(1− δi)[fj(LFj )− fj(LNj )]. Theorem 1 then follows
immediately.
29These results are based on the results that LNj → LFj as pi → 0 and LNj → 0
as pi → 1.
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Derivation of Condition (7). After differentiating δi with respect
to pi, it follows that
∂δi
∂pi
T 0⇐⇒ −piτj ∂∆i
∂pi
+∆i
[
τj − pif ′j(LNj )
∂LNj
∂pi
]
T 0,
where τj = fj(LFj )− fj(LNj ). Thus,
∂δi
∂pi
T 0⇐⇒ piτj ∂V
N
i
∂pi
+∆i
[
τj − pif ′j(LNj )
∂LNj
∂pi
]
T 0.
Thus, since the derivative of V Ni with respect to pi is identical to the deriv-
ative of pifj(LNj ) with respect to pi, it follows that
∂δi
∂pi
T 0⇐⇒ (piτj −∆i)∂V
N
i
∂pi
+∆ifj(LFj ) T 0.
Since (by the definition of δi) ∆i = (1− δi)piτj , it follows that
∂δi
∂pi
T 0⇐⇒ δipiτj
∂V Ni
∂pi
+ (1− δi)piτjfj(LFj ) T 0.
The desired conclusion (namely, condition (7)) follows immediately (since
piτj > 0).
Proof of Theorem 2. Letting V i denote the worst SPE (average)
payoff to player i, it is straightforward to verify that if either one of the two
inequalities stated below fails to hold, then there does not exist an SPE of
the base model in which the PRE path is the equilibrium path:
V FA ≥ (1− δA)ΠA(LNA , LFB) + δAV A
V FB ≥ (1− δB)ΠB(LNB , LFA) + δBV B.
The argument can be made by contradiction. Thus, suppose (to the con-
trary) that there exists an SPE in which the PRE path constitutes the
equilibrium path of play, and in which, for example,
V FA < (1− δA)ΠA(LNA , LFB) + δAV A.(A.2)
Now suppose player A considers making a one-shot, unilateral deviation from
the equilibrium path of play. His (average) payoff from not doing so is, of
course, V FA . His (average) payoff from doing so is greater than or equal to the
right-hand side of inequality A.2. This is because in the period in which he
unilaterally deviates, his optimal deviation is to set LA = LNA , and thus, in
that period his payoff is ΠA(LNA , L
F
B). His continuation equilibrium average
payoff (from the next period onwards) must, by definition, be greater than
or equal to V A. Consequently, given inequality A.2, it is optimal for player
A to conduct the one-shot, unilateral deviation. But this is a contradiction.
I now derive player i’s minimax payoff. The worst (from player i’s per-
spective) possible strategy that player j could adopt is the one in which
in each period, player j chooses not to work at all, and chooses to always
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fight (for any choices made in the past). The payoff per period to player i if
player j adopts this (minimax) strategy is (1−pj)fi(Li)+ vi(T −Li), which
is maximised at Li = LNi . Hence, player i’s minimax payoff is
wi = Πi(L
N
i , 0) = V
N
i − pifj(LNj ).
Theorem 2 follows immediately since V i ≥ wi.
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